Rational Discounting for Regulatory Analysis
W Kip Viscusit
This Article examines the economic basis for what is termed "rationaldiscounting," which entails full recognition of policy effects over time and exponential discounting at a riskless rate of return. Policies often cannot be ranked unambiguously in terms
of their present or future orientation.Both failure to discount and preferential intergenerationaldiscountinggenerate inconsistencies and economic anomalies.Office of Management and Budget (OMB) discounting guidelines now stipulate more reasonable
discount rates than earlierguidelines,but err in permitting open-ended preferentialrates
for intergenerationaleffects. This Article presents a methodology for monetizing the
value of statisticallife for people of different ages and at different points in time. Review
of regulatory analyses indicates increased consistency of discounting practices.However, an examination of two policies with intergenerationaleffects, stratosphericozone
regulation and nuclear waste storage at Yucca Mountain, reveals failures to adopt a
rational discounting approach. The influence of behavioralanomalies such as hyperbolic discounting may make full recognition of intertemporal effects in benefit-cost
analysis more consequentialthan the use ofpreferentialdiscount rates.

I. INTRODUCTION
Intergenerational discounting should be no different than withingeneration discounting. The policy position I will advocate in this Article is that distant benefits and costs should be recognized fully in the
policy analysis process, but that they should be weighted based on the
same discount rate methodology that is applied to effects on the current generation.
The impetus for a preferential rate may stem in part from the
dramatic mathematics of exponential discounting. Let the discount
rate be r and policy benefits and costs at time t be weighted by the
discount factor 1 / (1 + r).' Suppose the value of r is 3 percent. Then
benefits a year from now will have a weight of 0.97, benefits two years
from now will have a weight of 0.94, and so on. By the time one
reaches twenty years in the future, which might well be the latency
period for cancer risks from some environmental exposures, the discount factor is 0.55, or benefits and costs are weighted at just over half
of their within-period value. Likewise, the discount factor becomes
t University Distinguished Professor of Law, Economics, and Management, Vanderbilt
University. James Wawrzyniak provided excellent research assistance.
1 This formula can be found in a variety of basic texts. See, for example, Howell E. Jackson, et al, Analytical Methods for Lawyers 244 n 7 (Foundation Press 2003).
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effects one thousand years in the future. For the very distant future, all
but the most consequential benefits and costs will drop out of the
analysis.2 The discount weight pattern is a straightforward consequence of valuing all policy effects using a consistent discounting approach and need not be a cause for alarm.
Thoughtful commentators who advocate a preferential discount
rate for future generations have framed the issue in a manner that
creates a bias toward thinking of what lower rate should be applied to
effects on future generations.3 Thus, the question that is posed is
whether society should use the same discount rate for all policy benefits and costs, or whether a lower rate should be used in the future.
Indeed, the main policy issue in their view is how much lower the discount rate should be for effects on future generations.
Rather than framing the intergenerational discounting question
in terms of preferential lower rates, I would like to frame the policy
evaluation question in a more fundamental way. Should effects on
future generations even be considered in the policy evaluation process? Why not set their values equal to zero? Notwithstanding the possibility of constructing hypothetical social welfare functions in which
the welfare of future generations matters, the current generation's
policy choice task is much simpler. How do we make choices now to
maximize our own discounted well-being? The well-being of future
generations may enter our utility functions, or it might not. Some people may care about future generations in an altruistic manner, but
perhaps not a great deal. Per capita income levels and living standards
have risen over time, and if the past is any guide, future generations
will be more affluent and better off economically than we are, just as
we have had a higher standard of living than past generations. The
current citizenry consequently may feel quite justified in taking a
within-generation perspective and might not be too moved by the
plight of their more affluent, distant descendants.
The degree to which personal self-interest may have profound
consequences for future generations is reflected in the public's attitude toward climate change policies. Efforts to combat global warming through gas taxes will necessarily have a deferred impact on global
2
See Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Pricingthe Priceless: Cost-BenefitAnalysis of
Environmental Protection,150 U Pa L Rev 1553,1571 (2002) ("At a discount rate of five percent,
for example, the death of a billion people 500 years from now becomes less serious than the
death of one person today.").
3
See, for example, Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis,
and the Discountingof Human Lives, 99 Colum L Rev 941, 1015-16 (1999) (advocating for intergenerational preferences).
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climate change, which is a long-term environmental problem. To what
extent will older age groups be willing to pay more for gasoline so that
gasoline will be less harmful to the environment? My analysis with
Joni Hersch of the Eurobarometer survey data found that concern
with this environmental amenity declined steadily with age, which reflects the degree to which there is a strong component of self-interest
governing the public's willingness to pay for environmental benefits
over time. More specifically, in terms of the additional percent amount
that respondents were willing to pay for gasoline, the average response
was a high value of 2.8 percent among those age fifteen through thirtyfour, 2.3 percent for those thirty-five through forty-four, 2.1 percent for
those forty-five through fifty-four, 1.6 percent for those fifty-five
through sixty-four, and 1.0 percent for those sixty-five and over.' This
dramatic dropoff in valuation led the authors to conclude that there is a
generational divide in support for environmental policies!
If people are self-interested in the extreme, they might place no
value whatsoever on the well-being of future generations. From the
standpoint of their policy assessments, concern about what discount
rate should be used to value effects on future generations is irrelevant.
If the effects are treated as having zero value, the discounting of these
consequences does not enter. By including intergenerational effects in
our policy evaluation calculus, we have already made perhaps substantial headway toward placing a substantial value on interests subsequent generations have in today's policies.
Matters might of course be quite different if future generations
could bribe us to make sacrifices now to advance their interests. But
we do not know what their preferences are, and there is no mechanism
by which they can transfer resources to us. Legislatures can run
budget deficits to shift costs to the future, but these are not targeted to
advance specific policies that future generations have selected. Thus,
the extreme present-generation approach is to value future-generation
effects at zero and to use conventional discounting for currentgeneration effects.
The reference point I will adopt for my Article does not embody
intergenerational preference or intergenerational neglect. Rather, I
will assume that we treat effects on future generations in a manner
that is consistent with the discounting approach applied to outcomes
within our own generation. These future effects will be recognized
fully and brought back to present value with no deduction from the

4
Joni Hersch and W. Kip Viscusi, The GenerationalDivide in Support for Environmental
Policies:European Evidence, 77 Climatic Change 121,125 table 1 (2006).
5
See id at 134.
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benefits, even though current populations will not be directly affected.
Benefits and costs to future generations will have the same standing as
effects on the current generation. This symmetrical treatment already
embodies a quite strong degree of altruism toward future generations
that might greatly exceed the current citizenry's actual valuation of
future generations' welfare. However, just as intergenerational discounting preferences will create anomalies and inconsistencies, it is
easy to show that intergenerational discounting neglect will create
parallel problems. Using the same discount rate r symmetrically for all
policy benefits and costs will be my policy evaluation reference point.
Before considering the appropriate intergenerational policy, I will
first examine how discount rates affect the future orientation and the
environmental responsiveness of the policy. Each of these matters
may be unclear unless sufficient structure is imposed on the policy
choice. I then consider anomalies arising from failure to discount,
which is perhaps the extreme example of intergenerational preference,
and use of preferable discount rates for policies affecting future generations. These discounting practices and those currently in use for
regulatory analysis will lead to irrational economic consequences and
intertemporal inconsistencies. Finally, I examine the behavioral
anomalies that affect people's discounting behavior. Because of the
irrationalities of individual discounting, there is likely to be inadequate policy emphasis on efforts with deferred benefits. Thus, the major policy deficiency may be a failure to value policies with long-term
effects by the same extent as people would do if they had rational intertemporal preferences.
II. DISCOUNTING AND TEMPORAL ORIENTATION

A. The Ambiguity of Temporal Orientation
Increasing the discount rate necessarily reduces the discount
weight placed on future costs and benefits.6 Because costs and benefits
that occur immediately are not discounted at all, higher discount rates
necessarily place a lower relative value on future costs and benefits.
Researchers often attempt to characterize policies as being more or
less present oriented.7 However, before getting into discounting issues
in great detail, it is worthwhile to explore whether this simple intuition

6

My analysis adopts the benefit-cost criterion for policy choice. But see Tyler Cowen,

CaringAbout the Distant Future:Why It Matters and What It Means, 74 U Chi L Rev 5,27-28

(2006) (offering a different approach for forecasting a discount rate based on growth maximization).
7
See, for example, Revesz, 99 Colum L Rev at 946 (cited in note 3).
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of present or future orientation is always a useful way to categorize
policies.
In many policy choice contexts, a higher rate of discount will generate calculations that are less favorable to judgments of the policy's
net attractiveness. Suppose all policy costs occur at the outset, and that
all benefits are deferred. Thus, the net policy effects have a negative
value initially before turning positive thereafter. Consider the trajectory of net benefits less costs, where net benefits in year t equal the
difference in the benefits b, in year t and costs c,in year t. The time path
of (b, - c,) is initially negative as c, exceeds b, and then is positive once b,
exceeds c,. For this simple example, there is one sign reversal in the pattern of net benefits over time. In such situations, increasing the discount
rate will decrease the present value of benefits by a greater relative
amount than it will decrease costs, which are more immediate.
Within the set of possible policies that begin with negative net
benefits followed by periods of positive net benefits, there will be differences in the timing and duration of the positive net benefit period.
Policies in which the net benefits are more immediate will be viewed
as present oriented, while policies with deferred net benefits might be
termed future oriented. This simple characterization of policies is an
apt description of very well-behaved trajectories of benefits and costs.
In more complex patterns of costs and benefits, the appealing
logic of one policy being more future oriented than another does not
hold up. To see how the ambiguity in the ranking of temporal orientation arises, consider the closely related concept of the internal rate of
return, which I will call i. The internal rate of return i is the rate of
discount at which the present value of the difference between benefits
and costs of the policy is zero. For a conventional regulatory policy,
one might expect the present value of net benefits to be positive for
low rates of discount and negative for high rates of discount that are
above the value of i. For these payoff streams, the net payoffs are initially negative and then turn positive, so that there is one sign reversal.
Support of a lower discount rate consequently pushes the policy discussion into a region in which the policy is more attractive, as there is
no ambiguity in the temporal orientation of the policy.
Matters become more complicated in situations in which there is
more than one sign reversal in the time problem of net benefits. In
these instances, there can be multiple values of i that generate a zero
present value. The number of such values of i cannot be greater than
See Jackson, et al, Analytical Methods for Lawyers at 247 (cited in note 1).
9 See Paul A. Samuelson, Some Aspects of the Pure Theory of Capital,51 Q J Econ 469,
487 (1937). See also Paul A. Samuelson, A Summing Up, 80 Q J Econ 568, 571-73 (1966) (explaining why reswitching occurs).
8
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the number of sign reversals in the payoff stream. As a consequence,
for the simple payoff stream that begins with negative net benefits
followed by positive net benefits, there is only one internal rate of return. With more than one sign reversal in the payoff stream, there can
be multiple internal rates of return. The phenomenon of multiple internal rates of return is known as "reswitching." In such instances,
there may be no simple way to assess the present orientation of the
policy. Similarly, if one compares the difference in benefits and costs of
two policies, there may well be multiple sign reversals in those differences. Thus, it may not be possible to employ a simple policy choice
rule such as choosing policy A at low discount rates or choosing policy
B at high discount rates.
The reswitching phenomenon may be particularly important in
environmental contexts. In an early paper, Richard Zeckhauser and I
showed that the presence of irreversibilities, which are endemic to
environmental decisions, may induce situations of reswitching: policy
B is preferred to policy A at low values of r and high values of r but
not at intermediate values.0 The presence of uncertainty of a possible
environmental irreversibility, which is also a common characteristic of
environmental choices, also may induce such reswitching." Ranking
policies in terms of the degree to which they are present oriented or
future oriented consequently may not be a straightforward exercise, as
it is complicated by the influence of crossing payoff streams, the effect
of irreversibilities, and the role of uncertainty. 2 A preferable approach
is to select the discount rate that is appropriate and determine which
policies generate the greatest present value of the spread between
benefits and costs.
As a result, there will be two principal features of my treatment
of appropriate discounting policies. First, the focus will be on the
choice of the appropriate discount rate irrespective of whether doing
so should be characterized as being more present oriented or more
future oriented. Second, before characterizing policies as being more
or less future oriented, it is essential that the time pattern of payoffs
meets the requisite criteria for such simple designations. When benefit
and cost streams are complex, there may be no unambiguous ranking
of policies in terms of their temporal emphasis.

10 See W. Kip Viscusi and Richard Zeckhauser, EnvironmentalPolicy Choice under Uncertainty, 3 J Envir Econ & Mgmt 97,103 n 12 (1976).
11 Id at 105-08.
See Dexter Samida and David A. Weisbach, ParetianIntergenerationalDiscounting,74 U
12
Chi L Rev 145, 168-69 (2006) (stating that irreversibilities are best handled by using real option
theory).
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Are Low Discount Rates Pro-Environment?

Whether a low or high discount rate is pro-environment is also
not well-defined in general. Even if it is clear that a policy is more future oriented, that temporal orientation does not imply that the policy
is more pro-environment. Current destruction of natural wilderness
areas to provide longer-term timber production or oil and natural gas
reserves will impose environmental costs now and in the future, with
deferred intermediate financial gains. If there are negative net benefits in the near term, positive net benefits in the intermediate term,
and negative net benefits in the distant future, such a pattern of costs
and benefits fits the reswitching profile, with possibly two internal
rates of return and no unambiguous temporal ranking.
Even with more well-behaved benefit and cost trajectories, a
higher discount rate may be the pro-environment approach. My involvement with environmental issues began with a critique of the dam
building operations by the Department of Interior's Bureau of Reclamation.'3 That agency, which is the Western counterpart of the Army
Corps of Engineers, has built dams that are engineering marvels, such
as the Hoover Dam. However, even after most of the good sites for
dams had been used up, the agency continued to construct new dams
and sought to build dams in the Grand Canyon." Less catastrophic but
actual environmental harms have resulted from dams that the Bureau
has built, including the flooding of scenic areas, fish kills, and salinity
problems.'5 The agency did not monetize these environmental effects,
so that there was no environmental discounting issue to consider.
Dams are highly capital-intensive projects. As the rate of discount
is increased, the present value of the benefits is reduced, while the
costs are not much affected. As a result, the agency historically
showed a preference for using low discount rates, such as 2.5 percent."
Because a higher discount rate would make its policies appear less
attractive from a benefit-cost standpoint, the agency resisted efforts to
bring the discount rate in line with rates recommended by the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB).'7 Recommendations that a higher
discount rate be used would lead fewer projects to pass a benefit-cost
test, which in this instance would mean less environmental harm. Thus,
13 See generally Richard L. Berkman and W. Kip Viscusi, Damming the West: Ralph Nader's
Study Group Report on the Bureau of Reclamation (Grossman 1973).
14 Id at 75-76, 117-18 (using the Grand Canyon facts as an example in which accounting
for ecological impacts would have ensured a more rational project evaluation).
15 Id at 29-77.
16 See id at 229 table 4-A (listing the discount rates used in reclamation feasibility studies
during 1959-1971).
17 Id at 88-89 (describing OMB's efforts to encourage agencies to use a higher discount rate).
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for these public works projects with adverse environmental effects,
use of a higher discount rate was a mechanism for deterring these efforts. 8 Advocacy of a higher discount rate was the pro-environment
policy position.
A quite interesting intertemporal tradeoff arose with respect to
the 1992 Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of the drug
9
Taxol, which is used to treat ovarian cancer.' This drug, which was
manufactured from the Pacific yew tree, would lead to the saving of
lives in the near term. However, cutting down the trees now will lead
to depletion of the stock of Pacific yew trees and long-term environmental harm. Is the more responsible risk-reducing policy the one that
saves lives or trees, and if it is trees, what discount rate should be used
to assess the future value of the trees? Fortunately, the availability of
hybrid yews and semisynthetic Taxol diminished the controversy, but
the fundamental point remains: often ranking policies that have environmental effects over time in terms of the degree to which they reduce risk or are pro-environment is not a simple matter, in this case
because of competing risk concerns across time.
III.

DISCOUNTING ANOMALIES

A. Problems with Failures to Discount °
2
If policy effects are not discounted, several anomalies arise, ' and
it is worthwhile to review them here. I will focus on four anomalies to
give a sense of the fundamental problems that will be encountered.
Subtler inconsistencies, such as those that I discuss with respect to
intergenerational discounting, also may arise.
The first problem is what I have called the "permanent cost slam
dunk.'" Suppose that a development policy will lead to the permanent
loss of some very inconsequential environmental amenity that has a
value of $1 in each period. With that loss extended for an infinite time
horizon, the present value of the environmental harm is infinite. No
policy criterion with a finite payoff can ever offer great enough benefits to offset this infinite loss. In contrast, with discounting, the infinite

18 Id at 89.
19 See W. Kip Viscusi, Discounting Health Effects for Medical Decisions,in Frank A. Sloan, ed,
Valuing Health Care: Costg Benefit4 and Effectiveness for Pharmaceuticalsand Other Medical Tech-

nologies 125,126-28 (Cambridge 1995) (describing the debate surrounding Taxol's approval).
See Samida and Weisbach, 74 U Chi L Rev at 145-46 (cited in note 12) (arguing that
20
discounting is required despite its problems).
21
22

See Viscusi, Discounting Health Effects for MedicalDecisions at 134-36 (cited in note 19).

Idat136.
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stream of $1 losses has a present value of only 1/r, or $33 with a 3 percent discount rate.2
The second problem with zero discount rates is that it is always
desirable to defer policies if that same policy opportunity will be
available in the future. Let Policy A save thirty-three statistical lives
this year at a cost of $100 million, so that it costs just over $3 million to
save a statistical life. Let Policy B take effect one year later. It too
could save thirty-three statistical lives at a cost of $100 million. However, if we take our $100 million today and invest it at the rate of 3
percent, then we will have $103 million to spend on saving lives next
year. At a cost per life saved of $3 million, we can now save thirty-four
lives if we wait till next year. Whether our policy criterion is a benefitcost test or simply saving lives, waiting is always the superior choice
when there is no discounting and there is a positive interest rate.
Third, if there are technological changes that will make future
policies more effective in saving lives, as with improved pollution control technologies for cars, waiting is always superior. Suppose Policy A
saves thirty-three lives this year for $100 million, but Policy C entails
expenditure of $100 million next year and will save thirty-four lives in
one hundred years. Even without investing the $100 million to boost it
to $103 million in year two, Policy C will dominate, despite having to
wait a century for the life-saving benefits.
Fourth, benefits from any given policy action will rise as well. A
positive income elasticity of demand for risk-reducing policies of various kinds will by definition lead to a higher willingness to pay for these
same policy outcomes in the future. If benefit values grow at some finite
growth rate g, then the unit benefit value in t years will be (1 + g)'. As t
goes to infinity, these unit benefit values likewise become infinite. As
long as there is any positive annual growth rate in benefits, however
small, the benefit value becomes infinite if there is no discounting.
Serious economic discussions do not suggest that zero discount
rates are appropriate; however, particularly in policy contexts, there
might be suggestions that we do not discount lifesaving benefits or
effects on future generations. The anomalies that arise from not discounting are quite general. There are no special case exemptions from
a rational discounting approach.
B.

The Problematic Mathematics of Intergenerational Discounting
Most discussions of the consequences of discounting for the environment focus on long-term policies, often including discounting of
23
See Jackson, et al, Analytical Methods for Lawyers at 246 n 8 (cited in note 1) (providing
a formula for valuing an infinite stream of payoffs).
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effects on future generations. A higher discount rate necessarily gives
effects on future generations a lower weight. In a paradigmatic case of
benefits from activities now and in the near term with environmental
damage being imposed on future generations, there will be no sign
reversals of the environmental cost trajectory. A lower discount rate
always enhances the weight placed on future-generation effects.
Whether a preferential discount rate is desirable in such contexts is a
quite different matter.
While it is seemingly simple to suggest that one might use a lower
discount rate for policy benefits and costs for future generations, the
possible policy consequences of doing so are problematic. At a more
basic level, it is not even clear what might be meant operationally by
using a lower rate of time preference for future generations. As the
exploration of the various possibilities below will illustrate, none of
the seemingly plausible interpretations of time-inconsistent discounting leads to reasonable behavior. For concreteness, I will assume that
the appropriate discount rate for current-generation effects is r and
2
that the opportunity cost of capital does not change over time. Also,
let the current generation live for fifty years. The timing of the arrival
of these "future generations" and the duration of a generation is not
well specified by advocates of the intergenerational preference approach. Are we talking about fifty years, one hundred years, one thousand years? I will leave aside this ambiguity and assume that the
switch to future generations is well defined. For simplicity, I have assumed that there is only one future generation, but the discussion can
easily be generalized to multiple future generations.
Appendix 1 summarizes four primary categories of different discounting possibilities. The first row designates policies that only have
effects on the current generation. For these policies with benefits b,
and costs c, in year t, the discount rate is r, as under current policy
analysis practices. Then the present value of the policy is
5050.(b, - c,)I(l + r)'
1
t=0

The second row of Appendix 1 pertains to policy decisions that
future generations will make at the time when the future generation

begins. As with current policy guidelines, these future generations will
be making within-generation choices by discounting both benefits and
costs at a rate r. For simplicity, let the future generation's time horizon

be infinite, so that there are only two generations in the model. From
24 See Geoffrey Heal, Discounting: A Review of the Basic Economics, 74 U Chi L Rev 59,
64-65 (2006) (reviewing the conditions under which the utility discount rate is equal to the consumption discount rate).
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their within-generation perspective, the future generation will place a
value on policies given by
S(b, - c,)/(l + r).
(2)
t=0

The first row of Appendix 1 pertains to the discounting practices
of the current generation consistent with Equation (1), while the second row shows the future generation's counterpart decisions following
the same standard discounting principles. Both the first and second
rows of Appendix 1 are consistent with conventional discounting practices. Similarly, if one were to evaluate policies affecting both current
and future generations using standard discounting practices, one
would use a discount rate r for both periods.
The third policy row in Appendix 1 consists of policy decisions by
the current generation that affect future generations. Under this approach, there is discounting of all effects on the current generation by
a discount rate r, but future-generation effects receive a preferential
discount rate r' < r. This approach provides for a policy preference for
consequences affecting future generations.
Two variants of this future preference must be distinguished. The
first variant is case 3i in Appendix 1, which has a preferential discount
rate for effects starting when the future generation begins, which in
my example is year fifty-one, but this shift in discount rates does not
affect the within-generational values. The assumption that r' < r will
apply in year fifty-one in the future is of course quite arbitrary.
Thus, the policy criterion is
50
1
Z(bt- ct)(l +r) ' + (+r)1
(bt- c,)(l +r) t.
(3
t=O

(1

+ r')

5

t=o

This approach creates undesirable effects at the year in which the current generation ends and the next generation begins. The policy effects
at the last year of the current generation may have a value (b,0 c50) / (1 + r)5°, whereas the first year of the next generation will have
effects with a value (b5 1 - c51) / (1 + r') 51. So if the value of (b50 -c 50)
equals (b51 - c5 ), then the policy effects in year fifty-one will have a
greater present value than the effects in year fifty. Much of the same
reasoning applies to other future-generation effects. This approach
disadvantages distant members of the current generation relative to
the future generation. The attractive feature of this approach is that
the policy effects that occur within the future generation are being
valued in the same way that future generations themselves would
value these effects.
Policy 3ii also begins at preferential discount rate r' for the future
generation and continues to use that rate thereafter. This policy criterion is
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(b, -c,)/(1+r

t=0

1
+)'(+r) 5 1j
a

(b,- c)/(1+r')'.
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(4)

')1t=0

The formulation in policy 3ii introduces a new problem not shared by
policy 3i: the effects within the future generation are valued at a discount rate r', which is inconsistent with the future generation's own
rate of time preference r.
The final row in Appendix 1 illustrates what advocates of the
preferential discount rate approach for future generations more typically have in mind and which is embodied in the policy practices discussed below. If a policy has consequences for the current generation
and future generations, then all policy benefits and costs are discounted at a preferential rate r',leading to the criterion applied at the
initial period given by
S(b, - c,)I(l + r') .
(5)
t=0

This approach does not create the across-generational inconsistencies as with the third discounting policy. However, it does create
problems within generations. Suppose the policy has modest effects on
future generations and that the preponderance of the benefits are to
the current generation. Then the preferential discount rate r' may
make the present value of the policy with future-generational effects
greater than that of superior current policies valued using rate r. Similarly, suppose that all policy effects are to future generations and are
discounted at a rate r'.Then the policy ranking obtained using policy 4
with discount rate r' may be quite different than what the future generations themselves would have chosen based on policy approach 2
using the rate r that is appropriate for their own decisions. Thus, use of
the preferential rate r' in effect overrides the preferences that the future generation itself would have with respect to different time
streams of benefits and costs.
Problems also arise if we generalize these concerns to the very
long term. There is also not just one future generation. If the next future generation gets a preferential discount rate of r'<r, should we
not also give the subsequent future generation a preferential rate of
r"< r'? And so on. For much that same reason that r' < r will create
anomalous results for the current generation versus the next future
generation, this approach of r" < r' < r will likewise create anomalous
results for the next future generation compared to the subsequent
future generation.
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IV. OMB DISCOUNT RATE GUIDELINES
The guidelines for discounting issued by the OMB quite properly
have emphasized the fundamental economic determinants of discounting. Although for decades economists have generated elegant
models for proper discounting practices, such as explorations of the
social rate of discount," the dominant approach has been the private
opportunity cost of capital." Nevertheless, as I indicate below, the
OMB has begun to show some ill-advised and ill-defined flexibility
with respect to intergenerational effects.
The OMB has articulated the main principles for discounting policy effects. OMB Circular A-94 provides general guidance for the basic mechanics of discounting." Although the OMB discount rate had
long been set at 10 percent, this 1992 document issued the following
requirement and OMB's justification for why the rate is reasonable:
"Constant-dollar benefit-cost analyses of proposed investments and
regulations should report net present value and other outcomes determined using a real discount rate of 7 percent. This rate approximates the marginal pretax rate of return on an average investment in
the private sector in recent years."
Although the OMB did not document the justification for the 7
percent rate, it appears to have been too high a rate even in 1992. If in
fact the real, inflation-adjusted rate of return was 7 percent, it was
presumably because analyses justifying that rate included investments
that yielded a premium for risk. Such risk premiums should not be
included, as returns for the riskiness of an asset are not a reflection of
the intertemporal rate of tradeoff per se.
The discount rate I advocate is the riskless rate of return. 29 Doing
so does not imply that uncertainty is irrelevant. Suppose that the
benefits of a government policy are highly uncertain, as for example in
the case of levees to protect New Orleans from floods due to future
hurricanes. Proper analysis of program benefits based on the willingness of beneficiaries to pay for the uncertain benefits will reflect a risk
premium for these uncertain benefits, which can then be discounted
25 See, for example, Stephen A. Marglin, The Social Rate of Discountand the Optimal Rate
of Investment, 77 Q J Econ 95, 110 (1963) (suggesting a method for determining the social rate of
discount by relating the rate of economic growth to the marginal rate of social time preference).
26
See Heal, 74 U Chi L Rev at 61-62,77 (cited in note 24) (reviewing various approaches
to discounting).
27
See generally Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-94, Guidelines and Discount

Rates for Benefit-CostAnalysis of FederalPrograms8 (1992), available at 57 Fed Reg 53519 (1992).

Id at53522-23.
See Kenneth J. Arrow and Robert C. Lind, Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public
Investment Decisions, 60 Am Econ Rev 364, 377-78 (1970) (showing that publicly-borne costs
should be discounted at a riskless rate).
28

29
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using a riskless rate. While some observers have advocated using a
discount rate that incorporates uncertainty,n doing so necessarily imposes the mathematical structure of the discounting process that may
not track the effect of uncertainty over time. In general, there is no
reason to assume that the risk premiums associated with regulatory
benefit trajectories have the same mathematical structure as would
emerge from the exponential discounting function.
A good measure of the riskless rate of return is the government
bond rate. The 1992 three-month Treasury bill rate was 3.45 percent,"
which is just above the inflation rate in 1992 of 3.0 percent." The tenyear Treasury security interest rate was 7.01 percent, which is just 4
percent higher than the inflation rate.33 Moreover, returns on longerterm bond issues for durations such as ten years will include a premium for possible increases in inflation as well as a liquidity premium
to compensate investors for having their funds tied up for that long
period. Regardless of what government bond reference point we use,
OMB Circular A-94's 7 percent rate is too high.
A-4.1
In 2003, the OMB revised the guidance in its OMB Circular
The calculations provided by the OMB to justify its policy used average performance of ten-year Treasury notes and the rate of change in
the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Subtracting the CPI increase from
the bond rate yielded a real rate of return of 3.1 percent. 5 Why the
OMB did not report a similar calculation in 1992 to justify the 7 percent rate is never explained. Despite providing the 2003 analysis in
support of a 3 percent rate, the OMB concluded that agencies should
discount.6
use the earlier 7 percent rate as well as the 3 percent rate of
In particular, OMB regarded the 3.1 percent rate as the social rate of
time preference for projects that reallocate from consumption, with a
7 percent rate used otherwise. As a practical matter, most agencies
perform regulatory impact analyses using both rates.
What useful purpose might be served by continuing to perform
analyses using the inappropriate 7 percent rate? Using that rate may

30
See, for example, Louis Kaplow, Discounting Dol'ars; Discounting Lives: Intergenerational DistributiveJustice and Efficiency, 74 U Chi L Rev 79,106-07 (2006) (considering how the
uncertainty in various factors affects the intergenerational efficiency analysis).
31
Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Report of the President296 (2005), online at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/2005/2005-erp.pdf (visited Jan 22,2007).
32
33

Id at 283.
Id at 296.

34
Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis (2003), online at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/aOO4/a-4.pdf (visited Jan 22, 2007).
35

Id at 33-34.

Id at 34 ("For regulatory analysis, you should provide estimates of net benefits using
both 3 percent and 7 percent.").
36
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enable policymakers to compare the efficacy of proposed new policies
with earlier policies that were evaluated using the 7 percent discount
rate. However, presumably past policy decisions have been completed
and should be regarded as fixed costs. Should tradeoffs between current and past policies ever arise, the analysis should be done at a more
meaningful 3 percent rate applied to all policies being considered.
A second possible function of the 7 percent rate may be strategic.
That higher rate typically will reduce benefits compared to costs and
consequently frame the policy debate in a manner that enables the
OMB to impose more discipline on spending and regulations.
A third possibility is that the OMB is subject to a behavioral irrationality. Continued reference to a 7 percent rate may simply reflect
an anchoring bias reflecting the earlier discount rate mindset. Historically, the OMB has used excessively high discount rates, so the movement to the pair of discount rates at 3 percent and 7 percent reflects a
partial adjustment toward a rate that bears a plausible relationship to
the real rate of return on capital.
The official OMB guidance regarding intergenerational discounting has evolved over time. The 1992 budget Circular A-94 does not
make any explicit provision for intergenerational concerns. The 2003
Circular A-4 notes that inconsistencies may arise from using a preferential rate for intergenerational discounting, but nevertheless concludes by giving agencies leeway with respect to such discounting: "If
your rule will have important intergenerational benefits or costs you
might consider a further sensitivity analysis using a lower but positive
discount rate in addition to calculating net benefits using discount
rates of 3 and 7 percent."37 In this single sentence, the OMB apparently
has given carte blanche to a broad range of economically irrational
discounting practices.
What form such a departure from standard discounting norms
should take is not specified, nor does the OMB specify the extent of
such a departure. Should all agencies use the same preferential discount
rate for all effects on future generations? Does the timing of the effects
influence the acceptable discount rate? None of these issues is resolved by the OMB guidelines. What is clear is that the OMB has given
agencies the leeway to adopt the discounting policy approach 4 from
Appendix 1, with all the attendant problems that deviation creates.

37

Idat36.
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V. DISCOUNT RATE PERFORMANCE BY REGULATORY AGENCIES

While the OMB guidelines are clear, an interesting policy question is the extent to which agencies adhere to these guidelines and
apply consistent discounting practices. Some agencies might use a very
high rate to emphasize the importance of immediate payoffs and to
decrease the salience of adverse distant policy effects, whereas other
agencies might use a low rate to decrease the relative weight placed
on immediate costs.
Less than a decade ago, an inventory of discounting practices
found that there were wide disparities in the discount rates federal
agencies used, notwithstanding official OMB guidance. 8 In light of the
quite strong and explicit directive that the OMB now provides, do
agencies continue to display widely varying choices in the rates of discount they select?
The set of regulations I chose in order to make this comparison
was the list of all regulations from Table 1-4 of the OMB's Draft 2005
Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulation.39
Thus, rather than selecting a few regulations at random, this assessment
considers every regulation the OMB reported to Congress in 2005.
The results of this review appear in Appendix 2. The first column
lists the rule, the second column lists its status, and the second-to-last
column lists the discount rate used. Notably, the OMB guidance of 3
percent and 7 percent discount rates seems to have taken hold. Seven
of the regulations are evaluated using both rates.
In some instances, the regulatory agency expresses a rationale for its
choice or a preference between the two rates. For example, the interim
final rule for Medicare Prescription Drug Discount Card cites OMB
Circular A-4 and indicates a preference for the 3 percent rate: "The
Office of Management and Budget has indicated that a 3 percent discount rate better approximates the individual rate of time preferenceY °0
The next set of four regulations in Appendix 2 all used a 7 percent discount rate. Each of these regulations was a final rule, so there
was continuing use of the earlier 7 percent rate that presumably had
been adopted in analyses at earlier stages of the policy process. In
38
See Edward R. Morrison, Comment, JudicialReview of Discount Rates Used in Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 65 U Chi L Rev 1333, 1336 (1998) ("Agencies exhibit striking inconsistencies in their use of discount rates.").
39
Office of Management and Budget, Draft 2005 Report to Congress on the Costs and
Benefits of FederalRegulations 12-22 (2005), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/OMB/inforeg/
2005_cb/draft_2005_cbjreport.pdf (visited Jan 22,2007).
40 Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (HHS-CMS), Medicare Program: Medicare Prescription Drug Discount Card, 68 Fed Reg
69840,69913 (2003).
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these instances, the agency presumably simply chose not to redo the
earlier analysis once the policy review by the OMB was completed. It
is, however, notable that the 7 percent rate does conform with the
OMB Budget Circular A-94.
The next regulation did not indicate an explicit discount rate, but
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) did use a discounting
approach in its analysis. More specifically, EPA's discussion of Effluent
Limitations Guidelines and New Source Performance Standards for
the Meat and Poultry Products Point Source Category noted that
there was use of a discount rate for costs and benefits, though the specific rates are not indicated."1
The final nineteen regulations in Appendix 2 did not include any
discussion of discounting. This absence can be explained in four possible ways. First, the agency might claim that the regulation was issued
to address an emergency situation, such as mad cow disease. Indeed,
that claim was made for both USDA meat regulations: "The emergency situation surrounding this rulemaking makes timely compliance
with Executive Order 12866 and the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5
U.S.C. 601 et seq.) impracticable. ' 2 Second, an analysis using discounting may have been undertaken, but the discount rates were not reported in the final rule, as with the EPA's National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Stationary Reciprocating Internal Combustion Engines 3 and the EPA's National Emission Standards
for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Surface Coating of Automobile and
Light-Duty Trucks." Indeed, most of the regulations in which discount
rates are not reported are final rules, so that any analysis that was done
presumably was an earlier stage. Third, in some contexts there may be
no discount rate indicated because benefits and costs are annual events,
so that if the regulation is worthwhile in any given year, it is desirable in

In particular, the EPA noted that "[its] closure analysis is a discounted cash flow analysis
41
that compares the costs during a 16-year period from 2005 to 2020 to the earnings accumulated
during that same period. This analysis discounts both costs and earnings with the facility-specific
discount rate reported in the detailed questionnaire." EPA, Effluent Limitations Guidelines and
New Source Performance Standards for the Meat and Poultry Products Point Source Category,
69 Fed Reg 54476,54511 (2004).
42
USDA Food and Safety Inspection Service (USDA-FSIS), Prohibition of the Use of
Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and Requirements for the Disposition of NonAmbulatory Disabled Cattle, 69 Fed Reg 1862, 1871 (2004); USDA Food Safety and Inspection
Service, Meat Produced by Advanced Meat/Bone Separation Machinery and Meat Recovery
(AMR) Systems, 69 Fed Reg 1874,1883 (2004).
43 Environmental Protection Agency, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Stationary Reciprocating Internal Combustion Engines, 69 Fed Reg 33474,33498 (2004).
44 Environmental Protection Agency, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Surface Coating of Automobiles and Light-Duty Trucks, 69 Fed Reg 22602,22619 (2004).
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all years. Fourth, the agency may not have employed discounting because it was too difficult to accurately quantify costs or benefits.4
VI. DISCOUNTING AND THE VALUE OF STATISTICAL LIFE

A primary component of these regulations is the reduction of risks
to life and to health. Using discounting in this context has been a prominent concern in the literature and may at first glance appear to be indefensible. 7 Are we not in effect saying that lives saved today are worth
more than those saved in the future? And with very long-term effects
on human life, are we not devaluing entire future generations' lives?
To clarify the issues at stake and to get our thinking straight, it is
useful to examine the different contexts in which discounting enters in
the valuation of morbidity risk reductions. Discounting takes on several different roles with respect to the valuation of regulatory efforts
that reduce mortality risks. To clarify these different implications and
functions of discounting, I examine discounting in three scenarios: i)
discounting for the value of statistical life (VSL) for people of different ages at a point in time; ii) discounting the VSL for a person alive
now and for that same person at some future time; and iii) discounting
the VSL in the future for someone not already alive. Many of these
scenarios have arisen in previous treatments, and it is useful to clarify
how I would address each of themi

45 See, for example, Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division, Employment Standards Administration (DOL-ESA), Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive,
Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed Reg 22122, 22234
(2004) (listing costs to state and local governments in terms of annual expenditures).
46 See, for example, Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary, Computer
Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 69 Fed Reg 976, 1026 (2004) ("The analysis relied on a
qualitative assessment of the costs and benefits of the proposed rules, because we did not have
information of the kind and detail necessary for a quantification of those benefits and costs.").
47 The role of discounting of human lives is a central theme in Revesz, 99 Colum L Rev 941
(cited in note 3). For further discussion, see generally, John A. Cairns and Marjon M. van der Pol,

Saving Future Lives: A Comparison of Three Discounting Models, 6 Health Econ 341 (1997);
Magnus Johannesson and Per-Olov Johansson, Saving Lives in the Present versus Saving Lives in
the Future-Is There a Framing Effect?, 15 J Risk & Uncertainty 167 (1997); Maureen L. Cropper, Sema K. Aydede, and Paul R. Portney, Preferencesfor Life Saving Programs:How the Public

Discounts Time and Age, 8 J Risk & Uncertainty 243 (1994); Maureen L. Cropper, Sema K.
Aydede, and Paul R. Portney, Rates of Time Preference for Saving Lives, 82 Am Econ Rev 469
(1992); Maureen L. Cropper and Paul R. Portney, Discountingand the Evaluation of Lifesaving

Programs, 3 J Risk & Uncertainty 369 (1990); Maureen L. Cropper and Frances G.Sussman,
Valuing Future Risks to Life, 19 J Envir Econ & Mgmt 160 (1990); John K. Horowitz and Richard
T. Carson, Discounting Statistical Lives, 3 J Risk & Uncertainty 403 (1990); Clifford S. Russell,
"Discounting Human Life" (Or,the Anatomy of a Moral-Economic Issue), 82 Resources for the

Future 8 (1986).
48 The most prominent treatment in the legal literature of scenarios such as these appears
in Revesz, 99 Colum L Rev at 958 (cited in note 3).
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Consider first the appropriate VSLs for people of different ages
alive today. In particular, should we take a different approach to the
VSL for someone age thirty at time 0, which I denote by VSL (30,0),
versus a sixty-year-old at the current time, which I denote by VSL
(60,0)? This simple starting point enables us to separate the life expectancy differences by age from the timing effects.
There are two possible economic approaches to answering this
question, one of which I believe is correct. First, one could undertake a
form of quantity adjustment for the VSL. Older people have shorter
remaining life expectancies, so that mortality-reducing efforts are purchasing less of a quantity of life extension. Let the VSL be the sum of
a series of annual value of statistical life year (VSLY) components, so
that each year is equally valued apart from the influence of discounting. Although a coauthor and I introduced the quantity-adjusted value
of life concept that is mathematically equivalent to VSLY, we never
showed theoretically or empirically that each year of life has a constant value. 9 Rather, that formulation was an untested assumption of
the model. After some manipulation, it can be shown that for life expectancy L,
[VSLY]1
VSL=VSLY
r
(1 + r)L
r
To implement this formula, one can take the VSL implied by
wage-fatality-risk tradeoffs for the average worker and calculate the
constant annual VSLY implied by the VSL estimates. Assuming individuals of all age groups have the same VSLY, which may even appear
generous to older individuals given age-related declines in health
status, one can calculate for the person at age sixty the VSL associated
with the discounted stream of annual VSLY values that remain. In
effect, all VSL amounts are simply the present value of the stream of
VSLY levels, so that the VSL calculated using this approach always
declines with age.
In a series of papers, my coauthors and I estimated rates of time
preference with respect to years of life as revealed by decisions in the
labor market and product market. These analyses shared a common
approach. Each year of life was assumed to have the same value, and
the rate of discount was assumed to be the same for all workers. Thus,
49 See Michael J. Moore and W. Kip Viscusi, The Quantity-Adjusted Value of Life, 26 Econ
Inquiry 369, 386 (1988) (analyzing data to show workers' implicit discount rate when making
employment decisions and the implicit value per year of life).
50 Joseph E. Aldy and W. Kip Viscusi, Age Variations in Workers' Value of StatisticalLife 23
(National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 10199, 2003), online at http://
papers.nber.org/papers/w10199.pdf (visited Jan 22, 2007) (calculating VSLs based on age-specific
years of life expectancy).
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the focus was on averages across the population rather than the possible heterogeneity of these values for people of different ages.
Four of these studies dealt with labor market decisions involving
fatality risks. The first of these studies found that workers discounted
years of life at a rate of 10-12 percent, implying a value per year of life
of $170,000 in 1986 prices," A second article used a much more elaborate
econometric model and found a rate of time preference with respect to
future years of life of 11 percent.2 Subsequent labor market studies
using a variety of other econometric approaches yielded implicit rates
of discount of 2 percent53 and a range from 1 percent to 14 percent.
My product market estimates of implicit rates of time preference
were quite similar to the labor market results. The discount rate implied by auto safety choices involving used car preferences yielded
discount rate estimates for fatality risks from 11 to 17 percent. 5
There are a number of conclusions and cautionary observations
that emerge from this set of studies. First, at least at some point the
quantity of life at risk does matter. Otherwise, the estimated discount
rate would be infinite. Second, the estimated rates of time preference
across these studies vary from 1 percent to 14 percent, which is at least
a plausible range given observed market rates of interest. Third, even
if we accept these results at face value, they imply that the value of a
statistical life does not plummet with age. Consider a discount rate of
7 percent, which is at the midpoint of the estimated discount rate
range. A person with an infinite lifespan would lose (1/0.07) VSLY, or
14.3 VSLY. If there were only ten years of remaining life expectancy,
there would be a loss of 7.0 VSLY, or almost half the value with an
infinite lifespan." Losing one year of life is worth 1/14 of a VSL. From
the standpoint of individual preferences, short remaining lifespans are
worth a great deal -much more than the proportion of life at risk.
Several caveats are also in order. The results of these studies do
not imply that each life year has some VSLY value that is constant and
that the VSL is the present value of these individual year amounts.
Each of these features is an assumption of the models, not an empiri51

52

See Moore and Viscusi, 26 Econ Inquiry at 386 (cited in note 49).
See W. Kip Viscusi and Michael J. Moore, Rates of Time Preference and Valuations of the

Durationof Life, 38 J Pub Econ 297,316 (1989).
53 See Michael J. Moore and W. Kip Viscusi, Discounting Environmental Health Risks: New
Evidence and Policy Implications,18 J Envir Econ & Mgmt S-51, S-61 (1990).
54 Michael J. Moore and W. Kip Viscusi, Models for Estimating Discount Rates for LongTerm Health Risks Using Labor Market Data, 3 J Risk & Uncertainty 381,389 table 1 (1990).
55 Mark K. Dreyfus and W. Kip Viscusi, Rates of Time Preference and Consumer Valuations
ofAutomobile Safety and Fuel Efficiency, 38 J L & Econ 79,79 (1995).
56
For comparability with the infinite time horizon formula, I valued the first year of life at
the end of the period, or 1/1.07.
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cal result. Second, the findings of these studies and similar investigations should be treated with caution because they did not allow for
variations in risk levels with age. Moreover, the nature of the time
variations that were permitted imposed considerable structure on the
possible results. More recent studies, discussed below, recognize time
variations in risk and permit VSL to vary across the life cycle. These
new studies permit the VSL to rise and fall with age, whereas early
studies required that VSL decline with age.
In ongoing research, I have taken advantage of the capabilities
offered by more refined fatality-risk data and have written with coauthors a series of papers on age variations in the VSL 7 Although the
VSL displays an inverted-U-shaped relationship with respect to age,
the curve is fairly flat. As a result, the VSL (60,0) exceeds the VSL
(20,0). Going back to first principles, the VSL is simply the individual's
wage-risk tradeoff. A person's reluctance to incur risks may be quite
substantial even as life expectancy shortens, in part because of increases in wealth over time. As a result, the appropriate way to value
VSL (60,0) compared to VSL (30,0) is to use the explicit VSL amounts
pertinent to these age groups rather than to construct a VSL based on
a discounted stream of VSLY values derived from VSL (30,0). Doing
so takes the influence of discounting out of this VSL calculation.
The second discounting VSL situation involves assessing the VSL
of the person who is now thirty years old thirty years from now, which
is a situation that might arise when dealing with risks for which there
is a substantial latency period or a delay before a policy is enacted.m
The first component of this benefit value is the VSL for a similar sixtyyear-old person at the current time, or VSL (60,0). The next step is to
bring this amount back to present value, leading to VSL (60,0)/(1 + r)3 .
Third, if income levels are expected to grow over time, given the positive income elasticity of VSL of about 0.5 to 0.6,"' the VSL will grow at
some positive growth rate g. Thus, the appropriate VSL (60,30) value
for this situation is VSL (60,0)(1 + g)30/(1 + r) 3°, which is approximately

57
See generally Joseph E. Aldy and W. Kip Viscusi, Adjusting the Value of a Statistical Life
for Age and Cohort Effects (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper, 2006), online at http://
www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-06-19.pdf (visited Jan 22, 2007) (using an age-dependent fatal
risk measure to estimate age-specific hedonic wage regression); Thomas J. Kniesner, W. Kip
Viscusi, and James P. Ziliak, Life-Cycle Consumption and the Age-Adjusted Value of Life, 5 Contributions Econ Analysis & Policy Article 4 (2006); Aldy and Viscusi, Age Variations in Workers'
Value of StatisticalLife (cited in note 50).
58 For discussion of the policy concerns with latency periods, discounting, and the value of
life, see Revesz, 99 Colum L Rev at 950-55 (cited in note 3).
59
See W. Kip Viscusi and Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A CriticalReview
of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J Risk & Uncertainty 5, 63 (2003) (analyzing
mortality risk premiums to estimate income elasticity).
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VSL (60,0)/(1 + r - g)30, which is a formulation William Evans and I
derived two decades ago.6O

When I first introduced the VSL approach to government agencies in 1982, I was asked whether it is appropriate to discount lives at
all. 61 I had two responses to this issue, which still appears to be a matter of controversy.6 First, what is being discounted is not the number
of lives, but a monetary amount equal to the willingness to pay to reduce risks to life.? Second, it is possible to avoid discounting altogether by changing our frame of reference. If we don't discount the
VSL at year thirty, we could ask instead if it is worthwhile to incur
some cost c to obtain the benefit of one VSL at that time. But after
thirty years, the cost c will have a terminal value c(1 + r)", which leads
to the same benefit-cost analysis requirement, as VSL/(1 + r)" > c. '
Now consider the third case of someone who is not alive today
but who will be saved in thirty years at age thirty. The appropriate
value can be calculated using the same general approach as with the
second situation, taking the VSL (30,0) as the reference point. Thus, in
terms of our notation, we have
VSL(30,30) = VSL(30,0)(1 + g)3°/(1 + r)" ,

which is approximately
VSL (30,30) = VSL(30,0)/(1 + r - g)31.
If the growth rate in income is expected to be low, then the benefit
assessment can be simplified by dropping g from the calculation.
VII. POLICY PRACTICES FOR INTERGENERATIONAL DISCOUNTING

OMB guidance has given agencies leeway in how they discount
effects on future generations. As a result, it is useful to examine how
agencies have employed this discretion. Notably, none of the regulations in Appendix 2 involved intergenerational effects. There is currently a dearth of policies with truly long-term implications. The two
examples I consider in this section are stratospheric ozone regulations
and radioactivity exposure standards for nuclear waste storage at
Yucca Mountain. A common feature of these regulations is that the
60 See generally W. Kip Viscusi and William N. Evans, Utility Functions That Depend on
Health Status: Estimates and Economic Implications,80 Am Econ Rev 353 (1990).
61 See generally Pete Earley, What's a Life Worth?, Wash Post Magazine 11 (June 9,1985).
62
See Revesz, 99 Colum L Rev at 1016 (cited in note 3) ("With respect to harms to future

generations ... the use of discounting is ethically unjustified.").

63
Much the same point is made in Cass R. Sunstein and Arden Rowell, On Discounting
Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money and IntergenerationalEquity, 74 U Chi L Rev 171,173 (2006).
64 This example can easily be elaborated to incorporate a growth rate g in VSL.
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VSL is of central importance, as is concern for future generations.
What differs is the length of the time horizon captured by these future
concerns, as the future extends to 2075 in the regulatory analysis of
stratospheric ozone regulation and a million years in the analysis of
nuclear waste storage at Yucca Mountain. Each of these examples
yields a common lesson, which is that federal agencies need to develop
a sounder economic approach to discounting intergenerational effects.
A.

Stratospheric Ozone Regulations

The problem that very distant time periods create for regulatory
analyses is apparent from the EPA's 1987 analysis of its proposed rule,
Protection of Stratospheric Ozone. That regulation would have controlled a wide range of applications of CFC and halons, such as refrigerants. The benefits, which were calculated to the year 2075, included
reductions in skin cancer deaths, cataracts, crop damage, damage to
fish, damage to polymers, and sea level rise damage.
For concreteness, consider how the EPA addressed the skin cancer mortality risks. The EPA undertook a sensitivity analysis with
three scenarios: i) a high-benefits scenario of 1 percent discount rate,
$4 million value of life, and 3.4 percent annual growth in the value of
life; ii) a medium scenario with a 2 percent discount rate, $3 million
value of life, and 1.7 percent annual growth in the value of life; and iii)
a low scenario with a 6 percent discount rate, $2 million value of life,
and 0.85 percent annual growth in the value of life. The idea of undertaking a sensitivity analysis is a desirable feature. The choice of the
VSL was perhaps less well defined at that time than it is now, though I
believe the $2 million figure was certainly too low even for that era.'
The EPA's discussion of the final rule cited my work in the 1980s,
which indicated that the appropriate VSL was much higher than the
rate they had employed in the preliminary regulatory impact analysis.
Setting aside the choice of the value of life number, consider the
implications of their combination of discounting assumptions and
growth rate assumptions. For the high benefits scenario, the present
value PV(t) of a statistical life saved t years in the future is given by
=VSL(1

PV(t) =

.034)t

(1.01)t

,

(6)

which is approximately
See Environmental Protection Agency, Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 52 Fed Reg
65
47489,47513-14 (1987).
66 See W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health,31 J Econ lit 1912,1912-13 (1993).
See Environmental Protection Agency, Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 53 Fed Reg
67
30566,30596 (1988).
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PV(t) = VSL(1.024) t .

(7)

Consequently, there is no net discounting at all, as instead the
present value per life saved increases at a compound growth rate of
2.4 percent annually. To put this growth rate in perspective, after seventy-five years this approach makes the "discounted" VSL worth 5.9
times as much as the VSL for the current period. Saving one future
life in seventy-five years will consequently count about as much as
saving six lives today. There is no valid economic rationale for this
preferential treatment of future generations. An exhaustive exploration of the different ways we could sacrifice now to make people better off in 2075 could easily divert all our risk-reducing resources to
making our descendents' lives safer, given that their lives count about
six times as much as lives in the current generation.
The middle benefits scenario developed by EPA is more modest,
leading to
VSL(1.017)
PV(t)

(1.02)'

'

(8)

PV(t) = VSL/(1.003) t .

(9)

or a value approximately equal to

The almost-identical choice of the growth rate and the discount rate
fall short of being exactly offsetting, as perhaps the EPA wanted to
have at least some net nonzero discounting. Using this approach, a
statistical life saved in seventy-five years has a present value of 0.80 of
its value today.
The final low-benefits scenario best captures the idea that there
should be discounting. The relatively high 7 percent rate that was recommended by the OMB in that era is the starting point for the analysis. The approach leads to a net discount rate of 5.15 percent. A statistical life saved after seventy-five years will have a present value of
0.02 times a VSL today. Had the EPA used a more realistic base discount rate of 3 percent and coupled that assumption with its chosen
low growth figure of 0.85 percent VSL growth, the net discount rate
would be 2.15 percent, and the VSL in seventy-five years would be
0.20 times the value of saving a life today.
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B. Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Storage
One of the most consequential and bizarre regulatory analyses
pertaining to future generations is the EPA's 2005 analysis of standards for storage of nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain, Nevada.6 The
standards involved criteria for proposed storage of nuclear wastes at
an underground storage facility at Yucca Mountain, which is about
one hundred miles northwest of Las Vegas. The nuclear waste repository would be about three hundred meters underground, with an additional three hundred to five hundred meters between the repository
and the water table. The purpose of the proposed regulation is to establish new health and safety standards for this repository of radioactive material."
Before considering the details of the EPA's regulatory analysis, it
is useful to ask what an ideal regulatory analysis might look like. Because Yucca Mountain does not create nuclear wastes but simply
stores them, a pertinent question to ask is how much this site will reduce the risks from nuclear wastes as opposed to storage at current
locations. This comparison never arises in the EPA analysis, as the
mindset is with respect to incremental risks from a zero baseline risk.
What the EPA should have done is explore the risk-risk tradeoffs involved rather than adopting the implicit fiction that we now live in a
riskless nuclear-free world.
Using such a framework, the EPA should have analyzed the incremental cancer risk reductions associated with different standards,
the populations affected by these risks, the value of the statistical lives
saved by more stringent standards, and the discounted value of the
costs and benefits for standards of different stringency. Somewhat
strikingly, discounting of effects never even enters the analysis despite
the use of a policy time horizon that goes well beyond that of science
fiction fantasies.
The thought process underlying the proposed regulation bears a
strong similarity to the methodology used by the EPA for deciding
whether hazardous waste sites should be cleaned up by the Superfund
program.71 An individual risk approach guides the site cleanup decisions. If a current or hypothetical future individual subjected to a reasonable maximum exposure could be exposed to a lifetime cancer risk
68 See generally Environmental Protection Agency, Public Health and Environmental
Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, NV, 70 Fed Reg 49014 (2005).
Id at 49018.
69
70 Id at 49014.
71 See James T. Hamilton and W. Kip Viscusi, Calculating Risks? The Spatial and Political
Dimensions of HazardousWaste Policy 26-29 (MIT 1999) (describing the risk assessment procedures used in the EPA Superfund program).
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of 1/10,000, the site must be cleaned up. If the individual risk is between 1/10,000 and 1/1,000,000, cleanup is discretionary.2 Note that
nobody need be actually exposed to the risk. The number of people
affected by the risk does not enter into the decision, so risks to populations are not the matter of concern but only the individual risk reference point. In contrast, a benefit-cost approach would multiply the
cancer risk by the size of the exposed population, weight the values by
the pertinent VSL, and then discount the result.
The EPA's Yucca Mountain analysis is similar, with one additional level of abstraction. It does not consider the cancer risk probability, only the level of the radioactive dose. In particular, the proposed standard is split into two parts. For the next ten thousand years
the allowable dose is 15 millirems per year, while after ten thousand
years and up to one million years the allowable dose is 350 millirems
per year.73 In each instance, the reference person is the reasonably
maximally exposed individual," just as the Superfund focuses on the
reasonable maximum exposure for an individual.75 The reasonably
maximally exposed individual need not be a real person but instead is a
"theoretical individual representative of a future population group. 6
If we adopt the approach that only a single real or hypothetical
individual matters, how much weight should a risk to one person carry
in a benefit-cost assessment? Using a discount rate of 3 percent, one
case of cancer ten thousand years from now has a discounted value of
(1/1.03)1 ' 000, or 4.2 x 10129. Thus, even if the entire current United States

population were crammed into Yucca Mountain and exposed to a lethal dose of radiation, there would be a negligible value for the number of discounted cases of cancer that could be prevented by eliminating this risk.
But even these minuscule discounted cancer risks overstate the
actual risks for three principal reasons. First, the maximum possible
risk to an individual greatly exceeds the average risk to an exposed
individual, as documented for the Superfund." Second, exposure to
radioactive risks is a choice. People need not choose to build houses at
the Yucca Mountain site or rely on drinking water contaminated by
radioactive waste. Third, even taking the exposure limits at face value,
Id at 63 (stating the thresholds of risk which determine remediation policy at potential sites).
70 Fed Reg at 49014 (cited in note 68).
74 See id at 49019.
75 See Hamilton and Viscusi, CalculatingRisks? at 62 (cited in note 71).
76 See 70 Fed Reg at 49019 (cited in note 68).
77 See Hamilton and Viscusi, CalculatingRisks? at 63 (cited in note 71) ("While the goal of
Superfund risk assessment is to provide a plausibly conservative estimate of risk, a number of
studies suggest that [reasonable maximum exposure] estimates may greatly exceed this target.").
72
73
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my example above greatly overstates the severity of the risk. Exposure to radioactivity is not fatal at the 15 millirems per year level or
even at the 350 millirems per year level.
To justify the exposure limits, the EPA does not calculate the exposed populations or risk probabilities but instead gives risk reference
points. Consider, for example, the comparable background risk for
residents of Colorado, which the EPA views as comparable to Nevada
in terms of climatic features."8 The average background radiation level
is 700 millirems per year," which is double the million-year exposure
standard and almost fifty times the ten thousand-year standard. The
current average background risk level in the U.S. is 300 millirems per
year."' The incremental risks from Yucca Mountain will be far from
lethal and in fact were designed to keep the total risk from background risks and Yucca Mountain to the maximally exposed person at
or below 350 millirems per year, ' which is half the background radiation dose Colorado residents currently experience. Even based on
total risk levels, the standard is quite stringent and makes no apparent
sense.
Moreover, total risk should not be the focal point of any benefitcost analysis, however rudimentary it might be. What matters are the
incremental risks and benefits associated with a policy. Background
risks will be present with or without the risks of the Yucca Mountain
site. To the extent that dose-response relationships are nonlinear, the
risk calculations can account for any influence of background risks,
but the focus will be on incremental risks associated with different
regulatory options.
The EPA's fanciful time horizons of ten thousand years and one
million years are temporal reference points that would have dropped
out of any analysis had the agency engaged in any reasonable discounting of effects. To put these time periods in perspective, recorded
human history spans about five thousand years, and homo sapiens first
walked the earth about 120 thousand years ago.
How could the EPA have been led to propose a regulation for the
next million years based on our current, certainly primitive technologies for dealing with risk that surely will be less effective than technologies that will emerge in the future? The agency cites approvingly
the following guidelines offered by the National Academy of Public
Administration (NAPA):

See 70 Fed Reg at 49037 (cited in note 68).
Id.
80 Id at 49038.
81 Id.
78
79
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To inform decision-making, NAPA defined four basic principles:
* Trustee: Every generation has obligations as trustee to protect
the interests of future generations;
e Sustainability: No generation should deprive future generations
of the opportunity for a quality of life comparable to its own;
&Chain of Obligation: Each generation's primary obligation is to
provide for the needs of the living and succeeding generations.
Near-term concrete hazards have priority over long-term hypothetical hazards;
e Precautionary: Actions that pose a realistic threat of irreversible harm or catastrophic consequences should not be pursued
unless there is some countervailing need to benefit either current
or future generations."
It is useful to consider each of these principles in turn. The trustee
obligation appears to be reasonable insofar as it implies that futuregeneration effects should matter when conducting regulatory analysis.
The second requirement of sustainability is less compelling. Is
there no sufficiently large current benefit that would make a policy
desirable if it imposed a very small risk that the quality of life for
some future generation might be an infinitesimal amount lower than
our own? Rigid requirements of sustainability do not permit any such
tradeoffs and are antithetical to a balanced benefit-cost approach.
"Sustainability" is also an ill-defined environmentalist battle cry. What
does it mean for the future quality of life to be "comparable" to our
own? Must they have access to the same natural resources, the same
resources per capita, or sufficient resources to have the same life expectancy? How can we even tell if their quality of life is the same as
our own? We cannot readily take ourselves forward in time to determine the utility future generations will experience within the context
of their civilizations. Going back in time, at least from my vantage
point, I believe we are better off today than we were before indoor
plumbing and electricity even though there surely has been tremendous degradation of our natural resources. The task of ascertaining
whether decisions today will lead people to have a lower quality of life
in ten thousand years or a million years cannot ignore the role of
technological progress and change in lifestyle that we are ill-equipped
to predict. We don't know the absolute levels of their quality of life,

82 Id at 49035, quoting NAPA, Decidingfor the Future:Balancing Risks, Costs,and Benefits
Fairly across Generations 7 (1997), online at http://www.eh.doe.gov/oepa/data/napa.pdf (visited
Jan 22, 2007).
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how much our decisions today will alter that quality, or how we might
go about making a sensible intertemporal interpersonal comparison.
The sustainability objective is both inefficient and inoperable.
The chain of obligation principle expands on the trustee notion
and indicates that current effects are the primary obligation. Proper
discounting practices will ensure that appropriate weight is given to
current and future effects. The greater weight the principle urges be
given to near-term hazards seems to be broadly consistent with some
type of discounting.
Where I depart from that principle is with respect to the greater
weight that should be given to concrete risks as opposed to long-term
hypothetical risks. On the positive side, this guidance avoids the excessive attention to ambiguous risks that are not well understood. However, suppose that we face two types of risks-a certain risk of
1/10,000 and a subjectively assessed risk of 1/1,000 based on scientists'
best judgments. The mean level of the risk should be our guide, not the
precision of the risk estimate. This basic principle of Bayesian statistical decision theory" will ensure that we address risks even when sample sizes are too small to support classical statistical testing. The antiterrorism effort is an example of active policy despite small sample
size. Risks may be real, even when they cannot be precisely estimated.
The final precautionary principle is either innocuous or inefficient depending on its interpretation. No risk of any kind of harm,
whether irreversible or not, should be undertaken unless there is some
offsetting benefit. But irreversibilities per se need not be a barrier to
action. In a series of papers, I have examined the role of environmental irreversibilities and found that they do not alter the decision
analysis problem in a way that is too sweeping." Moreover, the existence of irreversibilities sometimes leads to a need to overregulate

83
See W. Kip Viscusi, Rational Risk Policy 127 (Oxford 1998) (critiquing the institutionalization of risk biases through government programs).
84 See generally Howard Raiffa, DecisionAnalysis: Introductory Lectures on Choices under
Uncertainty (Addison-Wesley 1968).
85
See W. Kip Viscusi, Irreversible Environmental Investments with Uncertain Benefit Levels, 15 J Envir Econ & Mgmt 147, 156-57 (1988) (concluding that investing fewer resources in
irreversible policies is not always optimal); W. Kip Viscusi, EnvironmentalPolicy Choice with an
Uncertain Chance of Irreversibility, 12 J Envir Econ & Mgmt 28, 37 (1985) (discussing when it is
important to learn about potential irreversibilities); W. Kip Viscusi, Frameworks for Analyzing
the Effects of Risk and Environmental Regulations on Productivity, 73 Am Econ Rev 793,794-97
(1983) (analyzing the irreversible impacts on firms from regulations); Viscusi and Zeckhauser, 3 J
Envir Econ & Mgmt at 103 (cited in note 10) (explaining why irreversibilities need not have a
dramatic impact on the analysis of a policy).
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risks and other times makes underregulation optimal." How the irreversibilities affect the analysis or the appropriate policy decision is
often ambiguous. What is clear is that there are threats to sound decisions that will emerge if we let our choices be guided by arbitrary commitments to precaution or sustainability rather than benefit-cost tests.n
The EPA's Yucca Mountain analysis embodies the kinds of inefficient policy prescriptions that emerge when policies are based on lofty
but misguided principles of intergenerational equity rather than a
sound benefit-cost approach. Had the agency assessed costs and benefits properly and discounted these values appropriately, the emphasis
would have shifted from arbitrary exposure thresholds for hypothetical, maximally exposed individuals to the discounted economic value
of the expected number of cancer cases that will be averted through

more stringent standards.
VIII. THE CHALLENGE OF HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING
My discussion thus far has been normative. What discount rate
should the government use in valuing regulatory benefits and costs
over time? Whether policies are considered for such assessment will,
of course, depend on political pressures exerted by the citizenry. If, for
example, there is no constituency for attempting to reduce the risk of
global climate change, then policies to combat global warming may
not even be considered for evaluation. Thus, it is useful to explore
what the behavioral aspects of intertemporal preferences are and
whether the pressure these preferences exert on policy will lead to

rational intertemporal political decisions.
The conventional discounting approach known as "exponential
discounting" dominates economic theory. Whether people behave in a
manner consistent with this theory is a quite different matter. Economists have long challenged the behavioral accuracy of the conventional discounting framework. In the usual exponential discounting
case, the rate of discount for payoffs in year t is given by 1/(1 + r)'. Be86
See Viscusi, 73 Am Econ Rev at 793 (cited in note 85) (concluding that not only does the
current level of regulation affect firm output, but so does the future level of regulation and degree of uncertainty regarding this future level).
87 The precautionary principle has been subject to a variety of critiques. See, for example,

Ragnar E. Lbfstedt, The Swing of the Regulatory Pendulum in Europe: From Precautionary
Principle to (Regulatory) Impact Analysis, 28 J Risk & Uncertainty 237,246-48 (2004) (reviewing

the current use of the precautionary principle in Europe and its effects); Christian Gollier and
Nicolas Treich, Decision-Making under Scientific Uncertainty: The Economics of the Precautionary

Principle, 27 J Risk & Uncertainty 77,99 (2003) (discussing problems with the precautionary principle, including the fact that it may favor opportunistic behavior); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the
Precautionary Principle, 151 U Pa L Rev 1003,1020 (2003) (stating that the largest problem with
the precautionary principle is that it paralyzes policy by forbidding both action and inaction).
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ginning with the conjecture by Robert Strotz, economists have hypothesized that people behave in a myopic manner and put an inordinate weight on immediate rewards." This phenomenon, which he
termed hyperbolic discounting, has led to a considerable experimental
literature documenting this form of intertemporal irrationality." A
useful simple formulation of this framework is the quasi-hyperbolic
discounting model, in which the discount factor is 1 in the initial period, but thereafter is given by 3/ (1 + r)', where 0 < 3 < 1.° Thus, all
deferred payoffs are scaled down by some factor 13.
Using a nationally representative sample, Joel Huber and I recently examined whether people exhibited hyperbolic discounting
when valuing the environment." The survey considered water quality
improvements that could occur now, or with a delay of two, four, or six
years. For delays of two years, people displayed an average rate of
time preference ranging from 12.7 percent to 14.3 percent.9 For delays
of four years, the implicit rate of time preference range was 8.0 to 8.4
percent, while for six years it was 7.9 to 8.7 percent. Based on the responses that led to these estimates, it is possible to estimate the quasihyperbolic discounting parameter 13, which was 0.48-0.53 for two-year
delays and 0.58-0.61 for delays of six years. Thus, there is evidence of a
substantial undervaluation of deferred benefits, which in effect receive
a weight of about 50-60 percent of their correct discounted value that
would prevail if people adhered to an exponential discount rate. People
have a strong preference for policies that generate immediate benefits.
This form of intertemporal irrationality is not simply an intellectual curiosity of interest only to economists. Hyperbolic discounting
has potentially far-reaching policy consequences because it indicates
that people are displaying an irrationally substantial weight on current
payoffs compared to the future. Public support for policies such as
environmental policies with very long-term effects consequently are
potentially strongly affected by hyperbolic discounting.
Given that people's revealed intertemporal preferences display
hyperbolic discounting, should policy prescriptions for discounting

88 See generally R.H. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization,
23 Rev Econ Studies 165 (1955).
89
See generally Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein, and Ted O'Donoghue, Time Discounting and Time Preference:A CriticalReview, 40 J Econ Lit 351 (2002) (reviewing intertemporal irrationality literature).
90 See David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting,112 Q J Econ 443,449 (1997)
(describing the hyperbolic discount function used to calculate a time-additive utility function).
91 See generally W. Kip Viscusi and Joel Huber, Hyperbolic Discounting of Public Goods
(National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 11935, Jan 2006), online at http://
papers.nber.org/papers/w1l935.pdf (visited Jan 22,2007).
92 Id at 38 table 4.
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practices reflect these preferences? My view is that this form of intertemporal irrationality should not be incorporated into official discounting practices, which instead should be based on the opportunity
cost of capital rather than the irrational, myopic concerns embodied in
hyperbolic discounting.
Nevertheless, hyperbolic discounting is of potentially substantial
policy importance. The pressure the public exerts on government officials to promote policies they prefer will lead to policy outcomes that
reflect the public's risk beliefs and preferences, to the extent that policy choices respond to the public's concerns. If people display an inordinate disregard for all future payoffs, then the political pressures on
agencies will tilt policies toward efforts with immediate payoffs rather
than longer-term benefits. This disregard of future effects is not a minor anomaly but may have a considerable effect if the public's hyperbolic discounting parameter 13is on the order of 0.5, in which case they
only count future payoffs at half their discounted value.
The question of whether we should respect the public's preference even if it is irrational is a recurring problem in policy contexts.
For risk perceptions, the question of whether policies should address
irrational fears has long been a matter of substantial debate." In the
risk belief context, I have long suggested that policies should be
grounded on the actual risk levels rather than public misperceptions
of the risk. Just as we would not want to ignore risks because the
public is not aware of the risk, we should not respond to hazards for
which the public has exaggerated beliefs. This same principle should
guide policies with respect to intertemporal irrationalities. The practical result of doing so will be more emphasis on policies that offer deferred benefits. How political support can be generated for efforts that
involve current sacrifices to achieve these deferred rewards may be
more problematic.
IX. CONCLUSION
My prescription for rational discounting is simple. The government should base the discount rate on the opportunity cost of capital.
The same discount rate should be used for benefits and costs. Policy
assessments should recognize the effects on future generations fully
and discount those effects consistently with discounting practices for
the current generation.
93 See, for example, Paul R. Portney, Trouble in Happyville, 11 J Pol Analysis & Mgmt 131,
132 (1992) (asking readers their willingness to pay to get rid of a contaminant with no risk of harm).
94 See Viscusi, Rational Risk Policy at 85-86 (cited in note 83) (providing examples of
government policies embodying individuals' biases in risk perception).
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There are several reasons why this approach will not lead to neglect of future generations. Most important is that there should be
increased consideration of policies with long-term consequences. In
much the same way that choices under uncertainty may involve neglect of possible states of the world, policy choices may neglect consequences in future time periods. There should be a concerted effort to
recognize that there are often important consequences of regulatory
policies on future generations. Somewhat surprisingly, none of the major regulations OMB reported to Congress in 20059 included regulatory analysis of future-generation effects. It may be that distant effects
do not play a major role in these policies. But perhaps it is also the
case that regulations that protect the future do not make it onto the
policy agenda. Even if there are potential benefits in the distant future, if the regulations that would generate these benefits are never
proposed and issued, the policy process in effect neglects these concerns entirely. Those concerned with the well-being of future generations consequently may have overlooked the more fundamental policy
problem. There will be no need to discount any future-generation effects at either a high discount rate or a low preferential rate if such
policies are never considered.
Neglect of the well-being of future generations may be quite rational in many instances. If policies only have near-term effects, then
the future consequences do not enter. However, if policies generate the
bulk of their net benefits far into the future, then the influence of hyperbolic discounting will tend to relegate such efforts to lower-priority
status in favor of those that generate immediate benefits due to the influence of behavioral anomalies in subjective rates of time preference.
Overcoming such intertemporal myopia may be extraordinarily
difficult given the substantial uncertainties involved with very long
time horizons. Waiting to take action may provide new information
that potentially may resolve the uncertainties as to whether policy
action is warranted. The existence of substantial uncertainties may
provide a plausible basis for the inaction that stems from hyperbolic
discounting, making it difficult to overcome intertemporal irrationalities. Once these policies with long-term consequences are evaluated
using a consistent discounting approach, the effects will be reduced by
the inescapable mathematics of discounting. While meaningful discounting will reduce the value of such effects, recognizing the positive
income elasticity of benefits will be at least partially offsetting. Moreover, even if policy effects one hundred years from now only have a
weight that is 0.05 that of current benefits, if the effects on future gen95

See Appendix 2.
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erations will be truly catastrophic, their discounted value will be consequential as well. If the effects will be minor and all but eliminated
from concern by rational discounting, then there is no compelling rationale for the current generation to make sacrifices.
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APPENDIX 1: TIME INCONSISTENCY EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT
DISCOUNT RATES FOR DIFFERENT GENERATIONS
Discounting Policy

Discount Rate (r)
Benefits to
Current Generation

Benefits to
Future Generation

Rational Discounting:
1. Current Effects, Current Decisions
2.

Future Effects, Future Decisions

Preferential Discounting:
3.

4.

Current Decisions, Future
Discounting Differential

r'< r

i. No change in within-generation
discounting.

r' < r,
but r within future
generation

ii. Within-generation
discounting changes as well

r'<r
including within
future generations

Current Decisions, Continuous
Differential Discounting

r'< r

r'<r
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APPENDIX 2: DIScOUNT RATES USED FOR REGULATIONS FROM
TABLE 1-4 OF THE DRAFT 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS
AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATION

Date

Asencv

Status

A enc

Rates Used
Rates Used

Cite

Bar Code Label Requirement for
Human Drug Products and Biological Products

Final

2/26/04

HHS-FDA

3% & 7%

69 FR 9120, 9163

Prior Notice of Imported Food
Under the Public Health Security
and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002

Interim
final

10/10/03

HHS-FDA

3% & 7%

68 FR 58974, 59063

Registration of Food Facilities
Under the Public Health Security
and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002

Interim
final

10/10/03

HHS-FDA

3% & 7%

68 FR 58894,
589500-51

Final

2/11/04

HHS-FDA

3% &7%

69 FR 6788, 6847

Interim
final

12/15/03

HHS-CMS

3% &7%

68 FR 69840, 69912

Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from Nonroad Diesel Engines
and Fuel

Final

6/29/04

EPA

3% & 7%

69 FR 38958, 39107

National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System-Final Regulations to
Establish Requirements for Cooling
Water Intake Structures at Phase II
Existing Facilities

Final

7/9/04

EPA

3% & 7%

69 FR 41576, 41662

Required Advance Electronic Presentation of Cargo Information

Final

12/5/03

DHS-CBP

7%

68 FR 68140, 68166

Area Maritime Security

Final

10/22/03 DHS-USCG

7%

68 FR 60472, 60479

Vessel Security

Final

10/22103 DHS-USCG

7%

68 FR 60483, 60507

Facility Security

Final

10/22/03 DHS-USCG

7%

68 FR 60515, 60536

Effluent Limitations Guidelines and
New Source Performance Standards
for the Meat and Poultry Products
Point Source Category

Final

9/8/04

EPA

Not Indicated

69 FR 54476

Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum in Domestic United States
Airspace

Final

10/27/03

DOT-FAA

None

68 FR 61304

Rtd ,

Rule

Final Rule Declaring Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedrine
Alkaloids Adulterated Because They
Present an Unreasonable Risk
Medicare Prescription Drug Discount Card

ftt
l)ath
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Rule

Status
Status

Date
Date

Aeencv
Agencv

Rates Used
Rates Used

Prohibition of the Use of Specified
Risk Materials for Human Food and
Requirements for the Disposition of
Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle

Interim
final

1/12/04

USDA-FSIS

None

Meat Produced by Advanced
Meat/Bone Separation Machinery
and Meat Recovery (AMR) Systems

Interim
final

1/12/04

USDA-FSIS

69 FR 1874

General Order Implementing Syria
Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Act of 2003

Final

5/14/04

DOC-BIS

69 FR 26766

United States Visitor and Immigrant
Status Indicator Technology Program ("US-VISIT"); Authority to
Collect Biometric Data from Additional Travelers and Expansion to
the 50 Most Highly Trafficked Land
Border Ports of Entry

Interim

8/31/04

DHS-BTS

69 FR 53318

Migratory Bird Hunting; Final
Frameworks for Early-Season Migratory Bird Hunting Regulations

Final

8/30/04

DOI-FWS

None

69 FR 52970

Migratory Bird Hunting; Early
Seasons and Bag and Possession
Limits for Certain Migratory Game
Birds in the Contiguous United
States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico,
and the Virgin Islands

Final

9/1/04

DOI-FWS

None

69 FR 53564

Migratory Bird Hunting; Migratory
Bird Hunting Regulations on Certain Federal Indian Reservations and
Ceded Lands for the 2004-05 Early
Season
Migratory Bird Hunting; Final
Frameworks for Late-Season Migratory Bird Hunting Regulations

Final

9/3/04

DOI-FWS

None

69 FR 53990

Final

9/23/04

DOI-FWS

None

69 FR 57140

Migratory Bird Hunting; Late Seasons and Bag and Possession Limits
for Certain Migratory Game Birds

Final

9/27/04

DOI-FWS

None

69 FR 57752

Migratory Bird Hunting; Regulations on Certain Federal Indian
Reservations and Ceded Lands for
the 2004-05 Late Season

Final

9/29/04

DOI-FWS

None

69 FR 58236

Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative,
Professional, Outside Sales and
Computer Employees

Final

4/23/04

DOL-ESA

None

69 FR 22122

Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity
Management in High Consequence
Areas (Gas Transmission Pipelines)

Final

12/15/03 DOT-RSPA

None

68 FR 69778

69 FR 1862
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Status

Date

Aeencv

Rates Used

Cite

Computer Reservations System
(CRS) Regulations

Final

1/7/04

DOT-OST

None

69 FR 976

HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Standard Unique Health Identifier for Health Care Providers

Final

1/23/04

HHS-CMS

None

69 FR 3434

National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants for Stationary Reciprocating Internal
Combustion Engines

Final

6/15/04

EPA

None

69 FR 33474

National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants: Plywood
and Composite Wood Products;
Effluent Limitations Guidelines and
Standards for the Timber Products
Point Source Category; List of
Hazardous Air Pollutants, Lesser
Quantity Designations, Source
Category List

Final

7/30/04

EPA

None

69 FR 45944

National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants for Industrial, Commercial, and Institutional
Boilers and Process Heaters

Final

9/13/04

EPA

None

69 FR 55218

National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants: Surface
Coating of Automobiles and LightDuty Trucks

Final

4/26/04

EPA

None

69 FR 22602

Rule

